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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
application of article IV, section 22, there is further indication consistent
with the notion that the provisions appear objectionable because of the
privilege they conferred to the school district and not because of their func-
tion per se. The court pointed out that the substantially identical provisions
in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act3 5 would not be repugnant to the constitutional proscriptions. The pro-
visions of the suggested legislation are distinguished from the stricken statutes
in that the former are uniformly applied to all the municipal and quasi-
municipal corporations.
The Lorton decision will not be the last in line to rule upon the propriety
of procedural considerations affecting liability of quasi-municipal corpora-
tions. Collectively, the recent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court have
established a trend toward placing upon governmental agencies, with certain
modifications, the same responsibility individuals or business entities have
with respect to tort liability. When future comment appears on the remain-
ing statutes, which were enacted to meet the additional responsibilities
placed on governmental agencies after the rejection of governmental im-
munity, it should be borne in mind that the reasons for the traditionally re-
stricted application of the proscription against special legislation also serve
to point out that governmental corporations, which cannot always be rea-
sonably expected to operate by the same rules that govern private corpora-
tions, have a greater need for notice of claims. The School District Tort
Liability Act recognized this. The Lorton decision, however, has rejected the
school districts' notice provisions and created a void in procedural needs.
To fill this void it appears likely that more emphasis will be placed on the
future enforcement of the uniform provisions of the Local Governmental
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act not only in the school
districts but in all municipal and quasi-municipal corporations.
Thomas Puklin
35 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 8-101 to -103 (1965).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-SECURED TRANSACTIONS-
JUDGMENT CREDITOR NOT A "BUYER"
AT EXECUTION SALE
Shawmut National Bank was the assignee of a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods perfected automatically under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC).' Neither the secured party nor the assignee, Shawmut,
had filed a financing statement. Charles Vera, an attaching judgment creditor
1The Uniform Commercial Code, section 9-302(1) provides that purchase money
security interests in consumer goods are perfected automatically but filing is required
for fixtures and motor vehicles required to be licensed.
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of the debtor, levied execution on the collateral2 and purchased it at the
subsequent execution sale for his own personal, family or household purposes
and without knowledge of Shawmut's interest. Vera contended that he was a
"buyer" under the terms of section 9-307(2) of the Uniform Commercial
Code' and therefore took free of the unfiled but perfected security interest of
Shawmut. The district court found for Vera and Shawmut appealed. A report
was dismissed by the appellate division but the Massachusetts Supreme Court
overruled the decision holding that Vera was not a "buyer" within the pro-
visions of section 9-307(2) and by way of dictum, that execution purchasers
generally could not be "buyers." National Shawnut Bank of Boston v. Vera,
-Mass. -, 223 N.E.2d 515 (1967).
The conditional sale at common law is a purchase money security interest
under the UCC today. Under a conditional sale the vendor retained title to
the goods until the payment of the purchase price, hence, as the conditional
buyer could not convey a greater interest than he had, a third party could
not acquire greater rights than those held by the vendor.4 But the UCC
departs from the common law concept of title5 and allows third parties to
defeat the conditional vendor via section 9-307(2). The Shawmut case is
significant in that it limits this departure to exclude those who buy at execu-
tion sales. The purpose of this note is to analyze the rationale of the Massa-
chusetts court in its attempt to balance the equities between the two innocent
parties within the scope of the UCC.
The Uniform Commercial Code is by no means clear as to the implications
of the term "buyer" as contained within the provisions of section 9-307(2).
Although the UCC does not define "buyer," it defines "purchaser" as "one
who takes by purchase,"0 and the term "purchase" is defined as including:
"taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue,
gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property."7
2 The collateral involved in the Shawmut case was a motor vehicle, but the Massa-
chusetts enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code omits a portion of section 9-302(1)
which requires filing for motor vehicles. Thus Massachusetts allows automatic perfection
in motor vehicles. MAss. REV. STAT. ch. 106 § 9-302 (1d) (1963).
3 UmoIO COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(2): "In the case of consumer goods and in
the case of farm equipment having an orignal purchase price not in excess of $2500
(other than fixtures, see Section 9-313), a buyer takes free of a security interest even
though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest, for value and
for his own personal, family or household purposes or his own farming operations
unless prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering
such goods."
4 Dorris v. Johnson, 363 Ill. 236, 2 N.E.2d 74 (1936); Gould v. Hiram Walker &
Sons Inc., 142 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1944).
5 Drain v. LaGrange State Bank, 303 Ill. 330, 335, 135 N.E. 780, 782 (1922).
6 UNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(33).
7 UNIFOR, COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(32) (emphasis added).
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In the Shawmut case the court concluded that as the execution sale is not a
voluntary transaction from the standpoint of the debtor, the buyer at an
execution sale is not a "purchaser," hence not a "buyer" if the terms are
synonymous. In their interpretation, the court construed the clause "or any
other voluntary transaction" as modifying the entire section but it can also
be read as modifying only the word "gift." There is no case law regarding
this construction. However, it must be noted that the debtor is not a party to
the transaction in an execution sale, but rather the seller is the sheriff.8 If
the word "voluntary" is considered from the standpoint of the parties to the
transaction, the argument of the Shawmut case must necessarily fail.
The Uniform Commercial Code defines "buyer in the ordinary course of
business"9 and within the section defines the term "buying" stating: "Buying
may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured
credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a pre-existing
contract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or
in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt." Whether one may extract
the definition of "buying" from the section depends upon whether the sections
of the UCC are severable. The UCC provides that provisions or clauses which
may be given effect by themselves are severable.' 0 The definition of "buying"
may be given effect by itself and therefore appears to be severable. Using
this definition then, one could easily conclude that an attaching judgment
creditor who purchases at his own execution sale is not a "buyer" because
he is taking in satisfaction of a money debt." Such construction has no effect
on the status of stranger purchasers, and this argument could not preclude a
stranger-purchaser from coming within the provisions of section 9-307(2).
Perhaps this is why the Shawmut case did not allude to this line of reasoning.
Writers have not given adequate attention to the full import of section
9-307(2) as most of their energy is spent in the discussion of section
9-307(1), analyzing the term "buyer in the ordinary course of business"
which would naturally appear to be a more complex term. Some writers have
implied that the "buyer" must purchase from the "consumer-seller" or
8 Coulter v. Blieden, 104 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 583 (1939).
But see Dupriest v. Bennett Bros., 61 Ga. App. 704, 7 S.E.2d 293 (1940) ; Van Graafieland
v. Wright, 286 Mo. 414, 228 S.W. 465 (1921).
9 UN1iOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(9).
10 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-108: "If any provision or clause of this Act
or application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this
Act are declared to be severable."
11Chader v. Wilkins, 226 Iowa 417, 284 N.W. 183 (1939); Vitale v. Duerbeck, 338
Mo. 556, 92 S.W.2d 691 (1936).
"debtor" in order to come within the provisions of section 9-307(2) .12 The
Shawmut case relied heavily on these writings and concluded that since the
seller at the execution sale is the sheriff and not the consumer-seller or debtor,
execution purchasers, whether attaching judgment creditors or strangers, do
not come within the protection of section 9-307(2). There are no cases other
than Shawmut which have interpreted these writings so strictly.
The UCC is supplemented by all existing bodies of law except insofar as
they are explicitly displaced by the Code.1 3 The Shawmut court argued that
since the defendant would not have taken free of the vendor's interest prior
to the enactment of the UCC,1 4 and since the Code is by no means clear as
to the construction of "buyer," pre-Code law should apply. But the common
law title theory of conditional sales (the underlying basis of the analogy) is
expressly displaced by the Uniform Commercial Code' 5 and section 9-307(2)
in particular is a complete departure from the pre-Code law. 16 Therefore,
there is no sound basis for resorting to the common law. In addition, the
real issue is whether an execution purchaser should be subordinate to other
good faith purchasers. This issue is not well served with a discussion of the
common law title theory. If common law is to be referred to at all, the status
of the execution purchaser should be the subject of the court's inquiry and
12 See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities among Secured
Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARv. L. REv. 838, 848 (1959), where it is stated:
"[O]ne who buys consumer goods from another consumer for his own personal . . .
use without knowledge of a perfected security interest takes the goods free of such
interest unless the secured party had previously filed [a financing statement] .... "
(emphasis added); MASS. BANKERS ASSN., BANKERS MANUAL 140 (1963), where it is
said: "A purchase money security interest in consumer goods need not be filed at all,
if the secured party is willing to take a chance that his security interest may be lost if
his debtor sells to someone who buys for personal use without knowledge of the
security interest" (emphasis added). But see BANXER'S MANUAL, supra at 865: "Since
holders of purchase-money security interests in certain consumer goods are not required
to file to perfect their security interests, a subsequent purchaser from the possessor of
such collateral has no means of learning of the prior security interest" (emphasis added).
See also Vernon, Priorities, the Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Financing,
4 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 531, where it was said: "A purchase-money security interest
in consumer goods which is perfected but unfiled is subject to being defeated by a good
faith consumer buyer of the goods from a consumer-seller."
13 UNIFORM COMERCIAL CODE § 1-103: "Unless displaced by the particular provi-
sions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, mis-
representation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating
cause shall supplement its provisions."
14 Marsh v. S.M.S. Co., 289 Mass. 302, 306, 194 N.E. 97, 99 (1935), where the title
theory of the conditional sale was the underlying theory.
15 UNroR COMMERRCIAL CODE § 9-202: "Each provision of this Article with regard
to rights-obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured
party or in the debtor." See generally the Official Comments to the above section.
16 Supra note 5.
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not the title theory. On this count, the purchaser at an execution sale at
common law was a bona fide purchaser if he purchased for a valuable con-
sideration, and without notice, actual or constructive;17 there was no distinc-
tion between the judgment creditor and a stranger purchaser.' 8 An execution
purchaser who was a bona fide purchaser took free of secret liens, unrecorded
conveyances, and even vendor's liens.' 9 So it would appear that even if the
court supplemented section 9-307(2) with the common law they could not
have logically subordinated the execution purchaser to other good faith pur-
chasers.
"The purpose of the filing requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code,
like the recording requirements generally, is obviously to protect subsequent
creditors who might not have extended credit had they known of the existing
security interest."120 Where the secured party perfects his interest auto-
matically and does not take the precaution of filing a financing statement,
subsequent creditors as well as execution purchasers have no means by which
-to discover the prior interest and are thereby prejudiced. This is by no means
wholly inconsistent with the underlying philosophy of the UCC. The Code
expressly subordinates junior lien creditors to unfiled but perfected security
interests,2' and the judgment creditor becomes a lien creditor upon the
issuance of the writ.2 2 In line with this underlying policy of subordinating the
lien creditor, it is untenable that the drafters intended that this subordinate
lien creditor could simply levy execution and improve his position via section
9-307 (2) by purchasing at his own execution sale. This is one of the strongest
arguments on behalf of the plaintiff. Nevertheless the Shawmut court alluded
only briefly to this line of reasoning. Again, this argument does not affect the
status of stranger purchasers at the execution sale and this undoubtedly, was
the cause of the court's cursory treatment.
Automatic perfection is a convenience to the secured party which is not
entirely free from risk. The secured party who does not file the financing
statement takes the risk of certain "buyers" taking free of the security inter-
17 Koch v. Wilcoxon, 30 Cal. App. 517, 158 P. 1048 (1916).
18 City of Sanford v. Ashton, 131 Fla. 759, 179 So. 765 (1938). Accord, City Building
Corp. v. Farish, 292 F.2d 620, 622 ,(5th Cir. 1961), where bankruptcy courts agree with
these principles. Contra, Carnahan v. Yerkes, 87 Ind. 62 (1882).
19 Maroney v. Boyle, 17 N.Y.S. 275 (1892), aff'd, 141 N.Y. 462, 36 N.E. 511 (1894).
20 In re Konfo Products Corp., 247 F. Supp. 229, 234 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Casterline v.
G.M.A.C., 195 Pa. Super. 344, 351, 171 A.2d 813, 818 (1961).
21UNIFOR-M COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301; In re Kretzer, 48 Berks L.J. 121 (1955).
See also United States v. Sommerville, 211 F. Supp. 843 (1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 712
(1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964). See generally Henson, Priorities under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 425 (1966).
22 Reardon v. Rock Island Plow, 168 F. 654 (7th Cir. 1909), aff'd, 222 U.S. 354 (1909).
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est within the provisions of section 9-307(2). In counselling the secured
party, one must assess the risk of being defeated by such a purchaser, against
the economics and efficiency inherent in perfection without filing. In balanc-
ing the equities between the two innocent parties one must ask how much
risk must the secured party assume in order to enjoy the convenience of
automatic perfection. With regard to automatic perfection, the UCC has
imposed a maximum limit of $2,500 on the purchase of farm equipment and
thirteen states have limited this further.23 Three states have imposed a
maximum dollar limitation on consumer goods, 24 and four states have deleted
the provisions of section 9-307(2) entirely. 25 These statistics exhibit the
tendency of the legislatures to lessen the risk assumed by the secured party as
the price for automatic perfection.
The Shawmut case intended to minimize the risk of the secured party being
defeated by execution purchasers generally. From the foregoing analysis, it
is quite apparent that there is no sound basis for excluding stranger pur-
chasers from the protection of section 9-307(2). The defendant execution
purchaser was a judgment creditor and not a stranger, therefore the reasoning
of the Shawmut court is mere dictum with regard to stranger purchasers. It
is the writer's hope that such reasoning ultimately remain dictum and that
courts in the future will distinguish between these classes of purchasers, and
allow stranger purchasers the protection of section 9-307(2).
Paul Episcope
23 UCC REP,. SERV. (State Correlation, 1967): Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Virginia, Wisconsin.
24 UCC REP. SERV. (State Correlation, 1967): Colorado, Maryland, Rhode Island
(Maine deleted consumer goods generally).
25 UCC Rap. SRV. (State Correlation, 1967): California, Kansas, Oklahoma, Tennessee.
WRONGFUL DEATH-SURVIVAL OF ACTION AFTER
DEATH OF SOLE BENEFICIARY
James McDaniel with his wife and daughter died as a result of injuries
sustained in a four car collision. A wrongful death action was begun on
behalf of Yvonne McDaniel, the infant next of kin of the decedents, seek-
ing damages for their death allegedly caused by the negligent acts of the
defendants. Some nine and one-half months after the accident, and while the
suit was pending in her behalf as sole beneficiary, Yvonne died from causes
unrelated thereto. The trial court granted the defendants' motion dismissing
the action on the grounds that the wrongful death action abated upon the
1967]
